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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is granted to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 
3 and Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Statement of Issues: The sole issue is a determination of when the 
statute of limitations begins to run on the termination of a contract of 
employment: at the time of the notification of intent to terminate or upon 
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the actual date of termination when the last work is completed by the 
employee and separation is complete. 
Standard of Review: "Because the propriety of a 12(b)[(6)] 
dismissal is a question of law, we give the trial court's ruling no deference 
and review it under a correctness standard." Ramsey v. Hancock, 79 P.3d 
423,424 (Utah App. 2003). "In its review, this court 'must accept the 
material allegations of the complaint as true, and the trial court's ruling 
should be affirmed only if it clearly appears the complainant can prove no 
set of facts in support of his or her claims.'" Id. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code ^78-12-23 sets forth the statute of limitations for a breach 
of written contract. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a breach of a contract of employment action in which 
Appellant claims damages arising from Appellee's breach of the written 
terms for termination under the contract of employment. 
The trial court granted Appellee's 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on the 
grounds that Appellant's filing of the complaint was five days over the six 
year statute of limitations for breach of a written contract. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. In 1986, Appellant Steven Clarke (Clarke), took employment with 
Appellee Living Scriptures (Living) as a salesman selling religious books 
and audio-visual materials door to door, (complaint, ^ 5) 
2. Through his work and enthusiasm for products of Living, Clarke 
was able to make a good living by working full-time with Living (complaint, 
19) 
3. Fo the first eleven years of Clarke's association with Living, he 
was an at-will employee working without the benefit of a written contract. 
On 7 April, 1997, Clarke signed a written contract with Living which set out 
Clarke's duties, established his compensation package and classified Clarke 
as an independent contractor, responsible for his own taxes. 
4. The written contract was for a term of one year, automatically 
renewed yearly unless terminated by either party, with Living granted the 
right to terminate only as stated in paragraph 10 of the employment contract: 
The Company may terminate this Agreement upon the 
Salesman's failure to abide by the terms hereof or upon his 
failure to meet the minimum sales requirement, which is $3,000 
of merchandise per month. 
(complaint, TJ20). 
5. After signing the contract, Clarke not only continued working as 
he had before entering into the contract, i.e., selling company materials door 
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to door, but in August of 1997, he became a manager of Living, recruiting 
salespersons, giving on the job training and consulting with upper 
management of the company, frequently traveling to the company head-
quarters in Ogden, Utah, (complaint, % 14). 
6. In connection with his newly acquired responsibilities, Clarke was 
encouraged to and did renovate his home garage into an office at a cost of 
$21,508.99. (complaint, H 13) 
7. Between August of 1997 and December of 199 /, numerous oral 
and written representations were made by Living to Clarke assuring him that 
he was now in management, that he would be a participant in a company 
profit sharing plan, and that Living recognized that he was working long and 
hard hours preparing for the coming summer sales season, (complaint, %L6). 
8. On December 9, 1997, without any prior notice, warning or 
caution, Clarke was handed a written notice of termination which 
specifically referred to the written independent contractor agreement of 7 
April, 1997, and which notice stated that his employment with Living was 
terminated, effective in 15 days, or December 24, 1997. (complaint, |^28) 
9. The notice of termination further stated: 
Please prepare and submit to us a list of all pending, unfinished 
business involving sales of Company products. 
6 
10. During the following 15 days, Clarke continued at his duties, 
compiling the list of pending and unfinished business, and finished his 
employment relationship with Appellee on December 24, 1997. 
11. The complaint in this matter was filed on or about December 17, 
2003, one week short of six years after Living's termination of the written 
contract. 
12. Subsequently, the trial court dismissed Appellant's complaint on 
the grounds tha1 the statute of limitations ran on the Appellant's breach of 
contract cause of action on December 9, 2003, the month and day that the 
notice of termination was handed to Clarke. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. CLARKE WAS WITHIN THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
FOR CONTRACTS AS THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DID NOT 
BEGIN TO RUN FROM THE DATE OF NOTICE OF TERMINATION, 
BUT FROM THE ACTUAL DATE OF TERMINATION OF WORK. 
This appeal focuses on whether Clarke filed his complaint against 
Living within the six year period of time required to file a complaint for 
breach of a written contract. By ruling that the statute of limitations started 
to run on December 7, 1997, the trial court found that Clarke did not have 
the right to proceed with his lawsuit against Living, stating that the 




A. Statutory Basis for Claim: Utah Code f78-12-23 sets forth the 
standard for the six year statute of limitations: 
Within six years — Mesne profits of real property — 
Instrument in writing. 
An action may be brought within six years: 
(1) for the mesne profits of real property; 
(2) upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon 
an instrument in writing . . . 
Clarke argued to the trial court that the statute of limitations did not 
start to run until December 24, 1997 which is fifteen days after the notice 
was given and was the effective date of termination actually set forth in the 
notice and was the date of Clarke's last work performed for Living. 
B. A Written Contract Existed Binding Clarke and Living: 
1. A written contract prepared by Living and signed by both 
Living and Clarke was signed by the parties on 7 April, 1997. 
2. The parties abided by the terms of the written contract to the 
extent that Living followed its terms and conditions when terminating 
Clarke by giving him fifteen days written notice before the 
termination was effective. 
C. When Does the Statute of Limitations On a Breach of Contract 
Claim Begin to Run? 
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1. In DOIT, Inc. v. Touche, Ross &Co. 926 P.2d 835, 843 (Utah 
1996) DOIT was a group of depositors of failed Utah thrift institutions who 
sued the thrifts' accountants, advisors and officers under various theories of 
misfeasance and malfeasance. Defendants raised the defense of the running 
of the statute of limitations and the Court states: 
Under Utah law, a statute of limitations begins to run against a 
party when the cause of action accrues.... As a general rule, a 
cause of action accrues when a plaintiff could have first filed 
^nd prosecuted an action to successful completion." Id. at 843. 
The Court examined the last possible date that a cause of action could 
accrue, which date was the last date an accountant's report was 
disseminated, and concluded that plaintiffs were nearly four years too late in 
filing the complaint. According to the reasoning in DOIT, it was the 
damaging effectiveness and negative impact of the false report which 
triggered the statute of limitations. Immediately upon dissemination of the 
false reports, the damage began to accrue to the DOIT plaintiffs. The 
plaintiff could have then immediately instituted a lawsuit based upon the fact 
that all the elements of a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation were present 
and therefore, the statute of limitations began to run. 
In the instant case, the damaging impact of the notice of employment 
termination, which notice itself required Clarke to perform additional tasks 
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and duties, did not take place until fourteen days after its issuance when the 
impact of the termination letter was effective. Before Clarke could file a 
claim for breach of contract, the contract had to be terminated so completely 
and absolutely that Clarke could legally claim that his rights under the 
employment contract were eliminated. At any time prior to the effective 
date, Living could have changed their mind and canceled the termination 
Because Clarke had continuing responsibilities under the notice to: 
prepare and submit to us a list of all pending, unfinished 
business involving sales of Company products. 
his duties were not finished, he continued to be responsible to Living, he was 
accountable for his actions and any claim for breach of contract was not ripe. 
b. Davidson Lumber v. Bonneville Investment, 794 P.2d 11,19 (Utah 
1990) states: 
"The general policy in Utah is that statutes of limitations 
commence to run when the cause of action accrues.... A tort 
cause of action accrues when it becomes remediable in the 
courts, that is, when all elements of a cause of action come into 
being. 
Plaintiff sought indemnification from defendant for damages arising 
from a defective wooden laminated beam which defendant manufactured 
and plaintiff sold. The beam caused the collapse of a building and plaintiff 
was required to pay damages arising from the defective beam. Defendant 
claimed that the cause of action arose when the beam collapsed, but the 
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Court ruled that the cause of action for indemnification arose only when 
plaintiff was required to pay for the damages which arose from the collapse 
of the beam. Until plaintiff was required to pay, there was no cognizable 
claim for indemnification by plaintiff against defendant, therefore, payment 
was an essential element of the claim for indemnification. When Davidson 
was absolutely bound to pay the third party claim, then all the elements 
needed for the cause of action accrued and only then did the statute of 
limitations begii to run. 
The case at bar bears a striking resemblance to Davidson, for until 
Clarke's employment actually ceased, that is, ended, finished, completed, 
concluded and defunct, no cause of action arose for Clarke to file a claim 
against Living. If Davidson had filed suit prior to being compelled by a 
court of competent jurisdiction to pay damages to the physically injured 
third party, Davidson's claim would have been dismissed, not having yet 
accrued for no one could divine whether Davidson would actually incur any 
damages, i.e., whether a judgment would be rendered against Davidson for 
selling a defective product. The basis for the dismissal would be 
speculative damages, for there was no knowledge by any party concerning 
the actual amount of damages. While there was the assumption that 
Davidson would be responsible to pay some measure of damages, until the 
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court actually handed down the judgment, until the court actually and 
physically decreed that Davidson was liable for a definite amount of 
damages suffered by the physically injured person, there was no cause of 
action by Davidson against the defendant. Regardless of the expectations of 
a judgment, an anticipated judgment is simply that: anticipated, and cannot 
be the basis for a lawsuit until the judgment actually exists. 
Such is the case at bar: when the termination notice was presented to 
Clarke, the notice stated that Clarke had two weeks of work left at Living. 
If, perhaps, on the third day of the two week period, Clarke filed suit 
alleging breach of contract and sought an injunction prohibiting Living from 
carrying out the threat of termination, Clarke's claim would have been 
quickly dismissed by the court, for no cause of action had accrued and no 
damages had yet been incurred for termination was not complete, damages 
had not ripened and an actionable injury was not present. There was the 
threat of injury and damage, but a threat does not ripen into a cause of action 
under a breach of contract claim. For instance, Living could have 
withdrawn the notice of termination, the parties could have negotiated a new 
contract, they could have reaffirmed the existing contract or they could have 
extended the deadline for cessation of employment. But when the eventful 
fourteenth day melded into the fifteenth day, Clarke then was unequivocally 
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terminated, the terms of his contract were void and he then had as his prized 
possession not an employment contract, but an accrued cause of action for 
breach of contract and various torts. 
Thus, it is vital that the lessons of Davidson be preserved in the instant 
case, for it states that the statute of limitations does not begin its intractable 
march on time until that sometimes elusive cause of action actually and 
fully accrues. 
c. Retherford v. AT&T Communications 844 P.2d 949, 975 (Utah, 
1992) affirming the findings of Davidson, opines that: 
Under Utah law, the statute of limitations begins to run when the 
cause of action accrues.... In order to determine when the limitations 
period began to run, then, we must determine when each of the causes 
of action became actionable in the courts. 
Retherford asserted tort claims against defendants for on the job 
sexual harassment. The Retherford court, following the dictates of 
Davidson, supra, examined when all the elements required to prosecute a 
claim for the tort of sexual harassment were final and actionable. Unable to 
find judicial fiat declaring when all the elements of retaliatory harassment 
accrue, the Court uses the tort of alienation of affections as a comparative 
cause of action, and states: 
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Applying this standard by analogy, we hold that the statute of 
limitations for intentional infliction of emotional distress does not 
begin to run until the distress is actually inflicted, i.e., when the 
plaintiff suffers severe emotional disturbances. 
Although easy to describe, this standard is difficult to apply, 
particularly because the element of emotional distress is specific to the 
plaintiff in each case. Id. at 975. 
Thus a sexual predator may undertake his nefarious acts on day one, 
but if the ill effects of his actions do not begin to inflict the victim with pain 
and agony and illness until day fifty, then the particular cauje of action does 
not accrue, begin to run or create the conditions for the start of the statute of 
limitations until the damage is felt and experienced on that fiftieth day. 
The Court then carefully examines the time line relating the claim of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress and establishes a date when the 
cause of action for intentional infliction accrued. Then the court examines 
the elements for plaintiffs negligent employment claim and states: 
Thus, as a general matter, the statute of limitations will not begin to 
run on a cause of action for negligent employment until all the 
elements of the employee's tort are present. Id. at 977. 
The conclusion sustained by the Retherford court is that a cause of 
action does not accrue, regardless of the nature of the claim, until all 
actionable elements on the cause of action are complete and present. 
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d. Brigham Young University v. Paulsen Construction 744 P.2d 1370 
(Utah, 1987) Brigham Young sued the contractor which had constructed 
certain on-campus buildings some five years earlier. The trial court 
dismissed the case, stating that a three year statute of limitations (Utah Code 
TJ78-12-26(1) controlled the case, but the Utah Supreme Court determined 
that the controlling statute was the six year Utah Code ^{78-12-23(2). 
Regarding the application of the statute of limitations, the Supreme Court 
states: 
The general rule is that a cause of action accrues upon "the 
happening of the last event necessary to . . . the cause of action. 
Id-at 1373. 
In the case at bar, the "last event necessary to the cause of action" was 
the final act of Clarke, on December 24, leaving the association of Living for 
the last time, having completed his duties set out in the notice of termination 
and having failed to convince Living to change its decision to terminate. It 
is not until that very last act, that final break with the employer, that the 
cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations clock begins to run. 
Living would have us believe that the singular event of giving the notice of 
termination was the last event necessary to happen starting the running of 
the statute, but common experience and the following precedential cases 
from California tells us otherwise. 
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e. Romano v. Rockwell International, Inc. 926 P.2d 1114 (Cal. 
1996). Romano was a 29 year employee of Rockwell International in the 
human resource department when one of his superiors became displeased 
with Romano and asked for his termination. Romano's immediate 
supervisor discussed with Romano the intent of the superior officer to fire 
Romano and suggested that Romano accept a one year teaching fellowship 
and then retire upon reaching 85 service points under the company's service 
plan. Romano understood that as of December 6, 1988, he was notified 
that he would be terminated, and that such termination was going to take 
place no later than May 31, 1991. Romano tentatively agreed to the plan, 
but never signed any document and did make some effort to reverse the 
decision of termination. No replacement for Romano was hired until 
December of 1989 at which time Romano was moved to another area of the 
company until May of 1990 when he began the teaching fellowship, retiring 
on May 31, 1991. 
Romano filed a complaint with the California Department of Fair 
Employment in September of 1991 and then filed a complaint with the court 
on December 9, 1991, alleging wrongful termination, retaliatory termination, 
breach of implied contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing and intentional interference with contractual relations. 
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Rockwell successfully pursued summary judgment at the trial court on 
the grounds that all of Romano's claims were barred by applicable statutes 
of limitations, claiming that Romano's causes of action ran from December 
6, 1988 when he was first notified that he was being terminated. Romano 
argued that the actual date of termination, or May 31, 1991 controlled the 
date when the causes of action accrued, but the trial court and the 
intermediate court of appeal disagreed, siding with Rockwell. 
In analyzing the contesting points of view, the California Supreme 
Court first states that "A cause of action for breach of contract does not 
accrue before the time of breach." Id. at 1119 and that "There can be no 
actual breach of contract until the time specified therein for performance has 
arrived." (emphasis in original). Id. and "When the promisor repudiates the 
contract before the time for complete performance is complete, then there is 
an anticipatory breach occurs." Id. The court then states: 
In the event the promisor repudiates the contract before the time 
for his or her performance has arrived, the plaintiff has an election of 
remedies-he or she may "treat the repudiation as an anticipatory 
breach and immediately seek damages for breach of contract, thereby 
terminating the contractual relation between the parties, or he [or she] 
can treat the repudiation as an empty threat, wait until the time for 
performance arrives and exercises his [or her] remedies for actual 
breach if a breach does in fact occur at such time. Romano, supra at 
1119. 
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Addressing the issue of the running of the statute of limitations, the 
Romano court states: 
in the event the plaintiff disregards the repudiation, the statute 
of limitations does not begin to run until the time set by the 
contract for performance As Professor Corbin has 
explained, 
"For the purpose of determining when the period of 
limitations begins to run, the defendant's non-
performance at the day specified may be regarded as a 
breach of duty as well as the anticipatory repudiation. 
The plaintiff should not be penalized for le rving to the 
defendant an opportunity to retract his wrongful 
repudiation; and he would be so penalized if the statutory 
period of limitation is held to begin to run against him 
immediately. 4 Corbin Contracts, (1951 ed.) ^989, p. 
967. Romano, supra, at 1120. 
Romano, the plaintiff, did disregard the notice of termination on 
December 6, 1988 and kept working, in the interim allowing Rockwell the 
opportunity to withdraw its notice of termination, which, to Romano's 
dismay, did not happen. During the intervening time, Romano worked and 
carried out his duties as required by Rockwell, therefore indicating that 
Romano elected to rely on the contract despite the breach of implied 
contract. 
As stated by the court" 
Indeed, whether the breach is anticipatory or not, when 
there are ongoing contractual obligations the plaintiff may elect 
to rely on the contract despite a breach, and the statute of 
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limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff has elected to 
treat the breach as terminating the contract.... Romano 
continued to perform and accept compensation until the time of 
actual termination, reflecting an election to treat the contract as 
still in effect. Id. at 1120. 
The Romano court concluded that the applicable statute of limitations 
did not begin to run until the actual date of the termination of Romano's 
employment, i.e., May 31, 1991 and that the statute of limitations had not 
run against him. 
This landmark California case is very similar to the case at bar: 
Clarke received the notice of termination, or the anticipatory breach of the 
contract, on December 9. He elected to not act on the breach, leaving to 
Living the opportunity to retract its wrongful breach of the employment 
contract, but when Living did not seize the opportunity to make right its 
anticipatory breach of contract, Clarke dutifully left employment on 
December 24 which is the date that the final element of the breach of 
contract finally accrued. 
f. Kasco Services Corp v. Benson, 831 P.2d 86 (Utah 1992) concerns 
an employee who had signed an employment contract promising not to 
compete against the employer for eighteen months after termination within 
the existing territory. Six years later, the original employer, Keene, merged 
with Kasco and Kasco sent new employment contracts to all the employees 
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for their signatures and the new contracts contained non-competition 
provisions similar to the former contracts. When presented with the new 
contract in August of 1988, Benson, who was one of the top salesmen in the 
company, refused the sign the new contract, proclaiming that he considered 
the noncompetition provisions to be null and void. However, he kept 
working until March 15, 1989 when he gave written notice of his 
resignation, effective March 1, 1989. 
He immediately established a company competing with Kasco and 
Kasco moved for the issuance of preliminary injunction based on the 
noncompetition agreement. The trial court granted the preliminary 
injunction, but ruled that the eighteen month period started from August of 
1988 when Benson indicated that he would not abide by the noncompetition 
agreement and refused to sign the new employment contract, therefore 
putting Kasco on notice that Benson would not abide by the terms of the 
restrictive non competition agreement. 
The Utah Supreme court determined there was an anticipatory breach 
of the noncompetition agreement: 
An anticipatory breach occurs when a party to an executory 
contract manifests a positive and unequivocal intent to not render its 
promised performance when the time fixed for it in the contract 
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arrives." Id. at 89, citing Hurwitz v. David K. Richards Co. 436 P.2d 
794,796(1968). 
Further, the Kasco court, agreeing with the principals of law set out in 
Romano, supra, states: 
The other party can immediately treat the anticipatory 
repudiation as a breach, or it can continue to treat the contract 
as operable and urge performance without waiving any right to 
sue for that repudiation. . . . Our court of appeals recently 
noted: 
A party that has received a definite repudiation from the 
breaching party to the contract should not be penalized 
for its efforts to encourage the breaching party to perform 
its end of the bargain, (emphasis added) Breuer-
Harrison, Inc. v. Combe 799 P.2d 716, 725 (Utah App 
1990). Kasco, supra at 89. 
We need not decide here whether Benson's 
announcement that he did not intend to abide by the 
noncompetition covenant was an anticipatory repudiation. It 
makes no difference in this case. If his remarks were an 
anticipatory repudiation, Kasco simply had an election. It could 
treat the remark as a breach, or it could continue to treat the 
contract as operable and encourage performance with waiving 
any rights under the contract. If there was no anticipatory 
repudiation, the noncompetition covenant remained in full 
force. Therefore, anticipatory repudiation or not, it was error 
for the trial court to rule that the eighteen months began to run 
when Kasco was put on notice of Benson's intent not to comply 
with the restrictive covenant. The beginning time should have 
been the actual date of Benson's resignation. Id. at 89. 
Again, referring to the facts of the instant case, the termination of 
Clarke's employment, the actual, not anticipatory breach of the contract, 
21 
took place on December 24, the actual date of Clarke's cessation of services 
for Living. 
g. Mullins v. Rockwell International 936 P.2d 1246 (Cal. 1997). 
Mullins was a 22 year employee of Rockwell and became a factory manager 
when an antagonistic person, Rubenstein, became president of the division. 
In January of 1988, Rubenstein consolidated factories and demoted Mullins 
to the position of project manager over an essentially non-existent project. 
Mullins was excluded from management meetings, was not allowed to 
interview for new positions, had his compensation substantially reduced and 
suffered humiliation and distress. By October of 1989, he retired. 
He filed a lawsuit in September of 1991, alleging constructive 
discharge, wrongful termination, breach of covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing and breach of oral employment contract. Rockwell moved for 
summary judgment on the issue of the running of the statute of limitations, 
claiming that the two year statute began to run when Mullins had notice of 
his demotion in January of 1988. The California Supreme Court disagreed, 
and summarized its decision in Romano, supra: 
We noted that in a contract action, the statute of limitations 
does not begin to run before the alleged breach occurs, and that 
the breach of promise alleged in Romano consisted of the 
termination of employment without good cause. . . . In addition, 
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we observed that even if the notification of termination in that 
case were viewed as a breach of the employment contract, such 
notification constituted an anticipatory breach that gave the 
plaintiff an election of remedies.... The plaintiff could elect to 
sue on the breach at once, or he or she could elect to continue to 
perform until the beach announced by the defendant came to 
pass. Because the plaintiff in Romano elected to continue to 
perform, we concluded that the statute of limitations began to 
run when the defendant's announced breach actually came to 
pass, that is, when employment terminated. Mullins at 1249, 
(citations omitted) 
The Court examines the elements of constructive discharge, which is 
not at issue in tJ e case at bar, and discusses the virtues and disadvantages of 
using various dates to determine when the statute of limitations begins 
running. The rule stated out by the Court is: 
The statute of limitations should not force the employee to 
institute premature legal proceedings, whether at the time the 
employer announces an intention to fire the employee, or at the 
time the employer begins to coerce a resignation by creating or 
knowingly permitting intolerable working conditions [cite] 
Finally, a rule providing that the statute of limitations begins to 
run on the date of actual termination of employment has the 
virtue of certainty. Id- at 1250. 
And so should not this Court impose upon employees the burden of 
instituting premature legal proceedings before the employee and employer 
have the opportunity to reconcile, to negotiate, to come to terms, but rather 
allow the statute of limitations to run from the actual date of the complete 
cessation of an employee-employer relationship. 
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CONCLUSION 
The core of the argument is simply whether upon a breach of contract 
of employment, the statute of limitations begins to run from the date that the 
employee is informed of the intention to complete the firing, or whether it 
begins to run upon the date that the termination is complete and final. 
Utilizing the principals enunciated in Utah law that a cause of action only 
begins to accrue when all the elements of the cause of action have occurred, 
supplemented by the well-considered California cases abc 'e which reason 
that the notice of termination is but an anticipatory breach, subject to 
revocation and that the statute of limitations begins to run upon the event of 
the actual and final termination, it is clear in this matter that the statute of 
limitations for Clarke began to run on the last day of his employment, 
December 24 and that his filing of the complaint in this matter was within 
the applicable statute of limitations. 
Therefore, this matter should be remanded to the trial court with 
instructions that Appellee is to file an answer and this matter should 
continue to trial on the merits. 
ROBERT D. ROSE, Attorney for Appellant 
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PROOF OF SERVICE 
I certify that I delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Appellant's Brief to: 
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185 South State Street, Ste. 1300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: 801/532-7840 
Telefax: 801/532-7750 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Living Scriptures, Inc. 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY/ 
"BepE 
IN THE'THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 




LIVING SCRIPTURES, INC, 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendant. 
[Piupuscd} 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
WITH PREJUDICE 
Civil No. 030928443 
Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
This matter came on for hearing before the Honorable Stephen L. Henroid on the lz~ 
day of /QrPrd , 2004, at Vxjk> o'clock p. .m. Plaintiff was represented by his counsel 
of record, Robert D. Rose. Defendant was represented by its counsel of record, Heidi E. C. 
Leithead and the law firm of Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless. Having reviewed the 
memoranda filed by the parties and having heard oral argument thereon and good cause 
appearing therefor, 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that this matter shall be and 
the same hereby is dismissed with prejudice on the ground that, based on the facts alleged in the 
Complaint and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in favor of plaintiff, 
A, Plaintiffs First Cause of Action (Breach of Employment Contract) is 
barred by the six-year statute of limitations set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23. 
B« Plaintiffs Second Cause of Action (Unjust Enrichment), Third Cause of 
Action (Detrimental Reliance), Fourth Cause of Action (Bad Faith), and Sixth Cause of 
Action (Lost Business Opportunity) are barred by the four-year statute of limitations set 
forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25. 
C. Plaintiffs Sixth [sic] Cause of Action (Breach of the Implied Covenant of 
Good Faith and Fair Dealing) is barred by the six-year statute of limitations set forth in 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23 and/or by the four-year statute of limitations set forth in Utah 
Code Ann. §78-12-25. 
D. Plaintiffs Fifth Cause of Action (Fraudulent Misrepresentation of Present 
Existing Facts] is barred by the three-year statute of limitations set forth in Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-26. 
E. Plaintiffs Seventh Cause of Action (Punitive Damages) is barred on the 
ground that, because each of plaintiffs claims sounding in tort are barred by the 
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applicable statutes of limitation, plaintiff cannot allege a tort cause of action to support a 
claim for punitive damages against defendant. 
ENTERED this Jl_ day of &prl£ , 2004. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Robert D. Rose 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
BY THE COURT: 
Stephen L. Henriod 
District Court Judg 
Heidi E. C. Leithead 
Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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